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企业与政府的双轨博弈分析
引用本文:彭正银,宋蕾. 企业与政府的双轨博弈分析[J]. 中国软科学, 2003, 0(12): 77-80
作者姓名:彭正银  宋蕾
作者单位:天津财经学院,企业管理系,天津,300222
摘    要:本文从双轨制——计划轨与市场轨的视角运用动态的博弈过程模型对企业与政府关系进行剖析,认为政府干预经济的运行轨迹通常与企业的内在运行轨迹存在差异,而随着政府直接干预程度的减小,政府和企业的租金收益与成本差值将会增加,进而增加政府和企业的总收益。

关 键 词:企业 政府 双轨制 博弈 收益
文章编号:1002-9753(2003)12-0077-04
修稿时间:2003-01-09

Dual- Track Game Analyses on Firms and the State
PENG Zheng-yin,SONG Lei. Dual- Track Game Analyses on Firms and the State[J]. China Soft Science, 2003, 0(12): 77-80
Authors:PENG Zheng-yin  SONG Lei
Abstract:The dual-track has been an important period in Chinese economic system reform. This paper analyzes the relationship of firms and the State from the dual-track (planned track and market track) perspective, and believes that the economic track of government intervention was different from firms' internal track. This paper also argues the margin that the rent earnings and cost for the State and firms would be increased with decreasing of the government intervention, and would further raise the total profit of the State and firms.
Keywords:the state  firms  dual-track
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