班轮联盟调箱优化模型及激励机制设计

班轮联盟中各班轮公司的最终目标是获得最大收益,这就导致成员的最优决策与联盟的最优决策产生冲突,进而使得联盟的稳定性受到影响。针对这一问题,以合作博弈与数学规划理论相结合的方式建立班轮联盟调箱问题的数学规划模型。设计以空箱互租价格和舱位互租价格为核心的收益分配机制,为联盟成员提供补偿性支付。为促进班轮联盟的稳定性,分别对联盟和其内部成员的决策建立整数规划模型,并通过线性规划逆优化技术令两者的利益一致。运用算例验证模型的正确性。

Optimization model of empty container allocation for liner alliance and incentive mechanism design

The ultimate goal of each liner company in a liner alliance is to maximize profits. This results in conflict between the optimal decision of the members and the optimal decision of the alliance, which will affect the stability of the alliance. To solve this problem, a mathematical programming model of empty containcer allocation issue for liner alliance is established based on the combination of cooperative game and mathematical programming theory. The income distribution mechanism centered on the mutual rental prices of empty containers and shipping space is designed to provide compensation for the members of the alliance. In order to promote the stability of liner alliance, the integer programming models are established for the decision making of the alliance and its members, respectively, and the inverse optimization technique of linear programming is used to make their interests consistent. Examples are used to verify the correctness of the model.