| 企业协会信誊建设功能的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 张贯一.企业协会信誊建设功能的经济学分析[J].软科学,2006,20(3):42-45. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张贯一 |
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| 作者单位： | 东南大学,经济管理学院,南京,210096 |
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| 基金项目： | 河南省留学回国人员科研启动基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 企业协会将"匿名社会"转变为一个"显性社会",使每个交易者都具有一个确定的身份,促进了信息的传播,从而破解了信誉建设过程中的"囚徒困境"和"集体行动的困境",形成了以"选择性激励"为特征的垂直约束机制和以"乡村效应"为特征的多边约束机制,从而促进了企业间信任关系的建立和企业信誉的产生,但是能否保证企业信誉的产生则取决于协会给会员企业带来的收益是否大于协会对失德企业处罚带来的损失.
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全(不对称)信息 囚徒困境 信誉建设 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409(2006)03-0042-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月28 |
Economic Analysis of Business Association and Credit- Building Functions |
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| ZHANG Guan-yi.Economic Analysis of Business Association and Credit- Building Functions[J].Soft Science,2006,20(3):42-45. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Guan-yi |
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| Abstract: | Business associations transfer "anonymous society" to "manifest society",thereby promote the information dissemination and makes every firm bear a certain identity,consequently,provide a solution to the "prisoners' dilemma" and the "collective action's dilemma".As a result,vertical discipline characterized by "selective incentives" and multilateral discipline characterized by "village effect" are formed inside the associations,thus this promotes the trust-building and promotes the emergence of firm's credit However,whether the associations can ensure it or not depends on the fact that the profit from the associations is more or less than the loss caused by the associations' penalty. |
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| Keywords: | incomplete(asymmetric) information prisoner's dilemma credit-building |
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