The Distinction Between Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in the Natural Sciences

In this paper I examine the particular question of the meaning of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values in the natural sciences and, if this would make sense, the possibility to transcend this distinction. I claim that the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values maintains its necessity as long as a certain sort of unity between the theoretical and the practical sides of the scientific endeavour has not been achieved. The distinction in question would cease to have meaning only from the perspective of such a unity, since in this manner the normative dimension of science would become an internal term for its historical construction.

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Maria PournariEmail:

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Maria Pournari   Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of Primary Education, School of Education, University of Ioannina. Ph.D. from Department of Philosophy, B.A. from Department of Mathematics and from Department of Philosophy, University of Ioannina. Field of Expertise: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Science, Cognitive science, Epistemology of Education, Modern Philosophy. Books: David Hume: Critique of Causation as an Attempt towards a “True Metaphysics”, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Ioannina, 1994. (in Greek), David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Of The Understanding, Introduction-Translation in Greek, Patakis Publication, Athens 2005