首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

不完全信息下讨价还价博弈及买方获益模型分析
引用本文:张济华.不完全信息下讨价还价博弈及买方获益模型分析[J].内江师范学院学报,2013,28(6):41-43.
作者姓名:张济华
作者单位:内江师范学院经济与管理学院,四川 内江,641000
摘    要:将在较为贴近现实的假设前提下,构造一个双边不完全信息下的讨价还价博弈过程,并分析其应满足的条件,最终得出买方获益模型,并加以分析得出买方获益的因素,解释了买方的获益与其购买数量和还价能力的关系.

关 键 词:博弈  讨价还价  买方获益模型

Bargaining under Incomplete Information Game and Analysis of the Buyer's Benefiting Model
ZHANG Ji-hua.Bargaining under Incomplete Information Game and Analysis of the Buyer's Benefiting Model[J].Journal of Neijiang Teachers College,2013,28(6):41-43.
Authors:ZHANG Ji-hua
Institution:ZHANG Ji-hua (College of Economy and Management, Neijiang Normal University, Neijiang, Sichuan 641100, China)
Abstract:This paper, under the assumption close to reality, constructs a game of bargaining in which both the seller and buyer don~t have complete information. And by analyzing the conditions which are required in the bargaining, the buyer's benefiting model takes shape. And it can well interpret the relations between the buyer's benefits and the number of goods he or she can buy and his or her bargaining ability.
Keywords:game  bargaining  buyer’s benefiting model
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号