| 公司接管中基于控制权收益的控股股东行为分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 屠巧平,张彩玉. 公司接管中基于控制权收益的控股股东行为分析[J]. 软科学, 2005, 19(6): 94-96 |
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| 作者姓名： | 屠巧平 张彩玉 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 西南交通大学,经济管理学院,成都,610031;河南大学,工商管理学院,河南,开封,475001
2. 河南大学,工商管理学院,河南,开封,475001 |
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| 摘 要： | 关于公司接管动因的研究文献表明,控制权的共享收益和私人收益是大股东出现的主要动力;在市场制度缺陷较大和法律对投资者保护较弱的国家,获取控制权私人收益的单位成本降低,控制权收益发生率提高;结果导致追求股东收益最大化的并购行为被扭曲,低效率的并购频繁发生。因此,规范和制衡控股股东行为应从市场制度缺陷入手,从相应的法律制度规则设立入手。
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| 关 键 词： | 控制权 控股股东 控制权收益 并购 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-8409（2005）06-0094-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-04-30 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-04-30 |
The Analysis of Controlling Shareholder''''s Behavior Based on Control Benefits in Corporate Takeover |
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| TU Qiao-ping,ZHANG Cai-yu. The Analysis of Controlling Shareholder''''s Behavior Based on Control Benefits in Corporate Takeover[J]. Soft Science, 2005, 19(6): 94-96 |
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| Authors: | TU Qiao-ping ZHANG Cai-yu |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economic and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031 ; 2. School of lndustrial and Commercial Management, Henan University, Kaifeng 475001 |
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| Abstract: | The literature on motives of takeover has showed that shared benefits and private benefits of control is main motive of large shareholders.In the countries with greater shortcoming of market system and investor protection,the unit cost of acquiring control benefits reduces and the occurring rate of control benefits rises.It eventually causes that takeover behavior of pursuing maximizing shareholders,wealth is twisted and inefficacious takeover frequently take place.Therefore,standardizing and balancing controlling shareholder's behavior should start from reducing the deficency of market system and from establishing corresponding legal system. |
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| Keywords: | control right controlling shareholder control benefits takeover |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
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