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地方政府间税收合作的博弈分析
引用本文:吴蕾.地方政府间税收合作的博弈分析[J].华南师范大学学报(社会科学版),2007,0(2):48-51.
作者姓名:吴蕾
作者单位:华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东,广州,510631
摘    要:运用博弈论方法,通过分析地方政府间税收合作关系形成的内在机制,指出了税收合作的基本前提条件,并进一步构建了地方政府间税收合作进化稳定策略模型,论证了政府间的税收合作符合博弈进化稳定策略,通过地方政府间的相互学习、适应、调整,税收合作必然会向深度和广度不断扩展,最终建立起合作的完善体系。

关 键 词:地方政府  税收合作  博弈  合作进化稳定策略  
文章编号:1000-5455(2007)02-0048-04
修稿时间:2006-06-21

An Analysis of the Game Theory of Taxation Cooperation among Local Governments
WU Lei.An Analysis of the Game Theory of Taxation Cooperation among Local Governments[J].Journal of South China Normal University(Social Science Edition),2007,0(2):48-51.
Authors:WU Lei
Abstract:It is a necessary trend to call for a new taxation cooperation under the present economic circumstances.This paper points out the precondition of the taxation cooperation between local governments in light of the game theory through the analysis of the inherent mechanism of the taxation cooperation relationship.And it further sets up the model of progressing stabilization strategy of taxation cooperation among local governments to indicate that a perfect system of cooperation would be set up in the end through mutual adjustment and learning from each other among local governments.The paper also offers some rational advices to accelerate the course of taxation cooperation among local governments.
Keywords:local government  taxation cooperation  game
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