| 关于"休谟问题"的新思考 |
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| 引用本文： | 李大志. 关于"休谟问题"的新思考[J]. 北京城市学院学报, 2007, 0(1): 91-94 |
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| 作者姓名： | 李大志 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京同创律师事务所,北京,100866 |
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| 摘 要： | “休谟问题”的焦点可以集中在所谓的“自然齐一律的假定”不可证明的问题上。休谟及同意休谟观点的哲学家们没有发现事实上人类头脑中有未经证明便确立的东西——原始的信念。如果我们不否认人类头脑中的确有信念这种东西,我们就不能否认人类头脑中有未被证实同时也是不证自明的东西——如果我们承认了这一点,休谟问题事实上已不复存在了。
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| 关 键 词： | 休谟问题 信念 知性认识 同一 |
| 文章编号： | 1673-4513(2007)-01-091-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-12-20 |
New Consideration on"Hume''''s Problem" |
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| Li Dazhi. New Consideration on"Hume''''s Problem"[J]. Haidian University Journal, 2007, 0(1): 91-94 |
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| Authors: | Li Dazhi |
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| Abstract: | "Hume's Problem" might be focused on the unproved ones of the so called "Assumption of the Law of the Natural Consistency".Hume and other philosophers agreed with him haven't found the virtual established original faith in human's brain which couldn't be proved.If we admitted the real existence of faith in human' brain,we wouldn't deny that there is something self-evident but unconfirmed in human' brain.If we admit it,Hume's problem will not exist actually. |
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| Keywords: | Hume's problem faith intellectual view identity |
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