The value of a good reputation online: an application to art auctions |
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Authors: | José J Canals-Cerdá |
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Institution: | (1) Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 10 Independence Mall, Philadelphia, PA 19106, USA |
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Abstract: | Using a unique dataset of art auctions on eBay, we conduct an empirical analysis of the value of a seller’s online reputation.
Several aspects distinguish our work from most existing research. We analyze a heterogeneous panel data consisting of a large
number of observations over a large period of time, including significant variation in reputation across and within sellers.
The panel structure of our dataset allows us to employ fixed effects techniques to control for observed and unobserved differences
across auctions. Our results point to a highly significant, and sizable, impact of a negative reputation on the behavior of
market participants and on market outcomes. Negative feedback is associated with a significant reduction in the number of
bidders and a reduction in the probability of sale; negative feedback is also associated with a significant reduction in sale
price. Consistent with previous research, the impact of additional positive feedback on market outcomes for the seasoned sellers
in our sample is not statistically significant. |
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Keywords: | |
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