主体的颠覆:拉康精神分析学中的"自我"

作为认识之主体的自我的身份无疑是哲学领域中的一个重大问题，但是这个问题在笛卡尔之前的本体论哲学中被视为不证自明的而放进了括号；认识论哲学将认识主体，也就是说将自我作为至关重要的问题提出来，但是最终还是将同一性和自主性赋予了它；语言论哲学的革命使人们得以重新思考这个问题，并对同一、自主的自我作了彻底的颠覆。但是，这种颠覆不是来自于形而上学，而是来自于拉康对弗罗伊德精神分析的创造性阐释。因为拉康的贡献，我们终于认识到，自我的同一和自主只是一种虚构和妄想，自我根本上是分裂的，因为自我其实就是一个他。自我的存在是为另一个人而建构的，建构的方式和结果使他像另一个人，而且其存在注定要被另一个人夺走。所以，自我的本质就是一种挫折。

On Subversion of the Subject

The identity of self as a cognizing subject is a very import an t issue in the realm of philosophy. This issue, however, has been regarded unass ailabl e by ontology before Cartesianism so as to be parenthesized. Epistemology has al ready questioned the nature of cognizing subject, nevertheless, it still attribu tes identity, oneness, and self-sufficiency to self. The revolution of cognitio n induced by philology makes people think it for the first time, and subverts dr astically the identity, oneness, and self-sufficiency of self. However, this su b version does not come from metaphysics but from Lacanian psychoanalysis. Owing t o the discovery of Lacan, we have finally understand that the identity, oneness, and self-sufficiency of self are only a kind of illusion, for self is essent ially another. Self ends up recognizing that his being has never been anythin g more than his own construction in the imaginary and that this construction und ercuts all certainty in him. For in the work he does to reconstruct it for anoth er, he encounters anew the fundamental alienation that made him construct it lik e another, and that has always destined it to be taken away from him by another.