| 动态联盟中防范道德风险的激励--监督机制研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 吴英.动态联盟中防范道德风险的激励--监督机制研究[J].科技与管理,2005,7(2):45-48. |
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| 作者姓名： | 吴英 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨理工大学,经济管理学院,黑龙江,哈尔滨,150040 |
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| 摘 要： | 激励—监督机制，对于防范道德动态联盟内的风险联盟有重要意义。在廖成林模型的基础上，加入盟员对联盟的亲和程度，这一被忽视但在其中起重要作用的因素，研究激励一监督机制的实施条件与最终达到的效果，从而对动态联盟中存在的道德风险体系研究提供有力的支持。
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| 关 键 词： | 企业联盟 动态联盟 道德风险 风险防范 激励机制 监督机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1008-7133(2005)02-0045-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年11月10 |
Preventing moral hazards in the dynamic alliance by the incentive and inspective model |
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| WU Ying.Preventing moral hazards in the dynamic alliance by the incentive and inspective model[J].Science-Technology and Management,2005,7(2):45-48. |
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| Authors: | WU Ying |
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| Abstract: | The mechanics of dynamic alliance, which are is designing one incentive and inspective mechanics of the dynamic alliance, make the whole and the company self make much money, is a best way to sdve the problems that occurred in the procession of the alliance running. In this article, I add one factor to the model of Liao Chenglin, which is short of studying in any articles, and will give a new method to settle the problem about moral hazards in the dynamic alliance. |
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| Keywords: | dynamic alliance moral hazard incentive and inspective model |
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