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我国电力批发市场最优竞价机制的选择
引用本文:刘晓光. 我国电力批发市场最优竞价机制的选择[J]. 预测, 2005, 24(1): 19-24,13
作者姓名:刘晓光
作者单位:南开大学,信息学院,天津,300071
摘    要:当前电力批发市场的主要的竞价机制包括单一价格单向拍卖、多种价格单向拍卖、单一价格双向拍卖和多种价格双向拍卖四种类型。针对我国电力批发市场的机制选择问题,本文通过模拟实验的方法,分别对"单一购买者"和竞争性市场两种情况进行了讨论。我们发现,在"单一购买者"条件下,单一价格单向拍卖机制具有最高的市场效率;而在竞争性市场环境下,单一价格双向拍卖则要优于其它几种竞价机制。

关 键 词:拍卖  电力市场  市场效率  模拟
文章编号:1003-5192(2005)01-0019-06

The Auction Mechanisms in Electricity Wholesale Markets
LIU Xiao-guang. The Auction Mechanisms in Electricity Wholesale Markets[J]. Forecasting, 2005, 24(1): 19-24,13
Authors:LIU Xiao-guang
Abstract:In the electricity wholesale markets, there are four type auction mechanisms. They are uniform-price single side auction, uniform-price continuous double auction, discriminatory single side auction and discriminatory continuous double auction. In order to select an optimum mechanism in Chinese electricity market, we compare the different of these four mechanisms with simulated experiments. The results show that the uniform-price single side auction is the best choice while there is only one buyer and the uniform-price continuous double auction is optimum in competitive markets.
Keywords:auction  electricity markets  market efficiency  simulation
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