| 企业集团预算激励模型及机制设计分析:基于成本控制视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 罗彪,余杰杰.企业集团预算激励模型及机制设计分析:基于成本控制视角[J].软科学,2011,25(6):76-79,91. |
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| 作者姓名： | 罗彪 余杰杰 |
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| 作者单位： | 中国科学技术大学管理学院,合肥,230026 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金委青年科学基金项目，教育部博士点基金新教师基金项目，国家自然科学基金委创新研究群体项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 在回顾企业集团常见激励模型的基础上,提出一种促使子公司滚动降低其运营成本的预算激励模型。通过对该模型基于局中人效用的博弈建模,论证该预算激励模型可激发子公司经理层主观能动性,促使其不断围绕成本控制目标提高经营努力程度,实现企业集团总部与子公司的激励相容。
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| 关 键 词： | 预算激励 成本控制 激励相容 |
Analysis of Budget Incentive Model and Mechanism Design of Enterprise Group:Based on the Cost Control Perspective |
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| LUO Biao,YU Jie-jie.Analysis of Budget Incentive Model and Mechanism Design of Enterprise Group:Based on the Cost Control Perspective[J].Soft Science,2011,25(6):76-79,91. |
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| Authors: | LUO Biao YU Jie-jie |
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| Institution: | LUO Biao,YU Jie-jie (School of Management,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026) |
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| Abstract: | Based on reviewing the incentive model in enterprise groups,this paper proposes an improved budget incentive model to reduce the operation cost step by step.Through establishing a game model,we prove that this model will stimulate the subjective initiative of subsidiary managers,improve their working efforts to control the costs,and achieve the incentive compatibility between headquarters and subsidiaries. |
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| Keywords: | budget incentive cost control incentive compatibility |
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